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CURRENT LEGISLATION
THE PERMISSIBILITY OF PICKETING IN NEW YoRK..-The New
York Anti-Injunction Act' prohibits the issuance of injunctions in
labor disputes unless seemingly impassable barriers are surmounted
by the claimant. 2 Despite the existence of other remedies,3 injunc-
tions, because of the comparative ease in obtaining them, were the
most frequent means used by employers in stopping strikes and boy-
cotts. 4 The Sherman Anti-Trust Act5 was a cause of this flood of
injunctive relief, for under its provisions, trade unions were held to
constitute monopolies.6 In 1914, however, the Clayton Act, hailed
by labor as its I'agna Carta, in addition to limiting the issuance of
injunctions in labor disputes,7 specifically exempted trade unions from
the provisions of the Sherman Act,8 and, as a result, strikes and boy-
cotts enjoined under the latter Act as an interference with interstate
commerce, were sustained as "implements in lawfully carrying out a
union's legitimate objects and purposes". 9 Thus under the Clayton
Act, strikes and boycotts (labor's means of maintaining a balance of
bargaining power between itself and capital) were held to be legal.
The victory was nominal, however, for by strict interpretations of
the wording of the Clayton Act, injunctions were granted in all cases
where a distinct employer-employee relationship did not exist.10 The
Federal Government attempted to strengthen labor's bargaining power
by passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act," the precursor of New York
Civil Practice Act Section 876a, under which a labor dispute is not
necessarily a controversy exclusively between employer and em-
ployee.' 2 Co-existent with this unstable equilibrium has been the
right to picket.
Picketing is labor's "power of speech", an implement in attain-
ing a union's legitimate aim. Originally it meant the sending of
1 N. Y. Civ. PwAc. ACT § 876-a (N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477).
2 Complainant must show compliance with all duties imposed by law, his
attempts to arbitrate the controversy, failure or inability of the police to give
adequate protection, inadequate remedy at law, threatened damage to property,
and other conditions precedent.
3 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 722 (disorderly conduct) and N. Y. PENAL LAW
8 580 (conspiracy). Now, under N. Y. PENAL LAW § 582, a trade union is not
a conspiracy.
' LIEN, LA3OR LAW AND RELATIONS (1938) § 217.
S26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1934).
6 Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908).
7CLAYTON ACT § 20, 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1934).
s CLAYTON ACT § 6, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1934).
9 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct.
703 (1938) ; LIEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 217; WALSH, CASES ON EQUIrY
(1930) 254; (1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 171.
10 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City, etc., Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42
Sup. Ct. 72 (1921); Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien, 278 Fed. 827
(D. C. Ohio 1922), appeal dismissed, 284 Fed. 850 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922).1147 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1938).
12 Ibid.
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watchers by a warring faction to spy on the opposition,13 but by ex-
tension, and by what has been done under its name, it now means
the attempt to induce others to withhold their services or patronage
from another.1 4
In commercial centers especially, picketing is labor's most potent
weapon, for by it, a controversy between employer and employee is
often won. When the gross receipts of a retail shop sink, the em-
ployer is usually forced, by this legal form of duress, to accede to
the picketers' demands. On the other hand, if picketing, in a par-
ticular case, were not permissible, the employee would be forced to
work, if work is desired or needed, at the employer's price. Thus
arises the necessity for ascertaining the permissibility of picketing in
the particular case, for upon this depends, not the rights of the parties,
but the outcome of the battle.
I.
Under the provisions of Civil Practice Act 876a, the courts are
restrained from issuing injunctions stopping threatened or continuing
unlawful acts in labor disputes unless there is an inadequate remedy
at law, the police have failed or refused to protect complainant's prop-
erty, irreparable and substantial damage is threatened to such prop-
erty, complainant will suffer more than the defendant by a denial of
the injunction, and some other requisites.' 5 These facts must not
only be alleged, but also proved.16 Furthermore, if all the preceding
are found to exist, the injunction may not prohibit any person from
"* * * Giving publicity to * * * or communicating information re-
garding the existence, or the facts involved in any dispute, whether
by advertising, speaking, picketing, * * *, or by any other method not
involving fraud, violence or breach of the peace." 17 Inasmuch as
the language of the statute is clear, and in view of the fact that the
courts have already held the Act as being declaratory of the common
law of this State,'8 it would seem that the section above referred to
concedes labor the right to picket peacefully. 19 The courts have al-
13 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY.
14 Beck v. Railway, etc., Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898) ; Julie
Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N. Y. Supp. 250 (1934) ; MARTIN,
LAW OF LABOR UNIONS (1910) § 161; cf. People v. Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187,
274 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1934).
15 The complainant must also show other prerequisites. See note 2, supra.
10 Krip Holding Corp. v. Canavan, 159 Misc. 3, 299 N. Y. Supp. 468
(1936); People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of Kings County, 164 Misc. 355,
299 N. Y. Supp. 9 (1937).
17 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §876-a (1) (f) (5).
Is May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 255 App. Div. 643,
8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819 (2d Dept. 1939); Greater City Master Plumbers Ass'n
v. Kahme, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 589 (1937).19 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130
(1927); Jones v. Maher, 62 Misc. 388, 116 N. Y. Supp. 180 (1909); Grand
Shoe Co. v. Children's Shoe Workers' Union, 187 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1920);
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ready created an exception to this general rule: public policy. The
latest case is Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe,20 wherein peaceful
picketing against a charitable hospital was enjoined on the theory
that the Legislature did not intend 876a to apply to such organiza-
tions. Other cases, decided long before the passage of the Act, have
enjoined picketing against the milk supply 21 and against the
manufacture of goods for governmental use during the World War.22
It is submitted that these two latter cases would be decided in the same
manner today for 876a does not create substantive rights, but merely
changes a form of procedure.
If the picketing in a labor dispute is accompanied by fraud, vio-
lence, or breach of the peace, such illegality will be enjoined, even
though a criminal prosecution is available,23 provided the claimant
complies with the prerequisites of 876a. Trespass 2 4 and obstruction
of ingress and egress by picketers has been enjoined.2 5  Expressed
or implied intimidation,2 6 abusive and insulting language,2 7 threats,28
misleading placards, 29 false oral statements,30 and violence 3l have
warranted injunctions. Mass picketing has been held to be not il-
legal per se, but if it tends to a breach of the peace, it is not permis-
sible.32 Fraudulent picketing, i.e., having inducement in malice or
ill will, is also not permissible.33 "It is difficult to canalize or classify
* * * conduct which is lawful and which is unlawful. There may be
isolated acts which cannot be interpreted as unlawful or wrong, but
Grandview Dairy v. O'Leary, 158 Misc. 791, 285 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1936). In
People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of Kings County, 164 Misc. 355, 299 N. Y.
Supp. 9 (1937), the court, by way of dictum, stated that the right is expressly
granted by N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a.
20 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (2d Dept. 1937).
21 Gottlieb v. Matchin, 117 Misc. 128, 191 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1921).
22 Rosenwasser Bros. v. Pepper, 104 Misc. 457, 172 N. Y. Supp. 310 (1918).
23 Manhattan Steam Bakery v. Schindler, 250 App. Div. 467, 294 N. Y.
Supp. 783 (2d Dept. 1937) ; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077
(1896) ; see note 19, supra.
24 Foster v. Retail Clerks', etc. Ass'n, 39 Misc. 48, 78 N. Y. Supp. 860
(1902).
25 Ibid.; People v. Hipple, 263 N. Y. 242, 188 N. E. 725 (1934).
28 Ibid.; People v. Lebensart, 144 Misc. 671, 259 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1932).
27'Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 281 N. Y. 150,
22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939).
28 Ibid.
29 People v. Jenkins, 138 Misc. 498, 246 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1930), aff'd, 255
N. Y. 637, 175 N. E. 348 (1931) ; People v. Lebensart, 144 Misc. 671, 259 N. Y.
Supp. 309 (1932); People v. Epstein, 159 Misc. 330, 287 N. Y. Supp. 429
(1936).
30 People v. Kaye, 165 Misc. 663, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 354 (1937).
31 Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931); International,
etc. Co. v. Wendrich, 122 N. J. Eq. 222, 193 Atl. 808 (1937) ("the right to
strike does not mean to strike with clubs, stones, or other weapons").
32 People v. Phillips, 245 N. Y. 401, 157 N. E. 508 (1927); People v.
Nixon, 248 N. Y. 182, 161 N. E. 463 (1928).
33 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130
(1927); see Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203 (1923).
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the accumulative effect of many of such acts may together create a
situation which passes the bound of patience and tolerance and cre-
ates a hugger-mugger situation, the only object of which can be to
compel the one upon whom pressure is exerted to 'bend the pregnant
hinges of his knee that thrift may follow fawning.' "34 The border
line in this type of case may be very shadowy and elusive. What
would appear to be fraud, violence, or breach of the peace, must be
resolved upon the basis of reasonableness. As this question is often
decided by the judge, and in view of the fact that all judges do not
think alike because of the difference in their education and environ-
ment,35 it is rather difficult, in fact almost impossible, to state that
some particular act is illegal, as constituting fraud, violence, or breach
of the peace unless such act would clearly appear so to everyone.
Courts have gone further than merely restraining illegal picket-
ing. If the pickets persist in unlawful acts, after being enjoined, their
right to picket even peacefully is forfeited.3 6  Usually the courts have
enjoined only the fraud, violence, or breach of the peace and have
permitted peaceful picketing,37 at times even limiting the number of
pickets 3 8 or stating what should appear on the placards.3 9
II.
In controversies where a labor dispute, as defined by 876a and
the interpretations of said section by the courts, is not involved, picket-
ing accompanied by fraud, violence, or breach of the peace is en-
joinable.40  There is never any question on this score if the elements
of equity procedure are observed, i.e., inadequate remedy at law, or
to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The question arises as to the per-
missibility of peaceful picketing.
Justice Hofstadter, in Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond,41 has stated
that "while the courts have dealt extensively with the subject of
picketing in labor disputes, the propriety of picketing for purposes
34 Mlle. Reif v. Randau, 166 Misc. 247, 249, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 515, 518
(1937). Personal conversations by the author with various police officers who
have been assigned to "picket duty" reveal the fact that they are ordered to see
that the pickets keep at least six feet away from the premises picketed and
that they move continuously. No particular individual may be approached per-
sonally, nor may the pickets indulge in "overloud" shouting. See People v.
Ward, 159 Misc. 328, 287 N. Y. Supp. 432 (1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 615,
5 N. E. (2d) 359 (1936).
35 Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894) 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8.
a Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 281 N. Y. 150,
22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939); Long Island Drug Co. v. Devery, 6 N. Y. S. (2d)
390 (1938).
37 Remington Rand, Inc. v. Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N. Y. Supp.
1025 (4th Dept. 1936), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 635, 18 N. E. (2d) 37 (1938).
38 Ibid.39 Edjomac Amusement Corp. v. Empire Union, 273 N. Y. 647, 8 N. E.
(2d) 329 (1937).
40 See notes 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, supra.
4 152 Misc. 846, 274 N. Y. Supp. 250 (1934).
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other than expressing demands of labor has never been decided. * * *
The right of an individual to protest in a peaceable manner against
injustice or oppression, actual or merely fancied, is one to be cher-
ished and not to be proscribed in any well-ordered society. It is an
essential prerogative of free men living under democratic institutions.
And it is salutary for the states, in that it serves as a safety valve in
times of stress and strain." 42 This theory was approved in People
v. Kopezak,43 but the court therein sustained a conviction of dis-
orderly conduct, in spite of the fact that the picketing against rent
increases was peaceful, since the lawful and orderly manner of ten-
ants was to file complaints with city bureaus. These cases have dealt
with the right to picket as tangent to the right of speech and assem-
bly,44 but, nevertheless, the law in reference to such picketing is still
unsettled.45 It is too early to venture a rule as yet.
However, where labor pickets in a dispute not within the defini-
tion of a labor dispute, the law is settled. Peaceful picketing is not
permissible. Thus, in A. S. Beck Co. v. Johnson4 the court en-
joined peaceful picketing by a negro group because of the danger of
race riots and reprisals. 47
In cases where the complainant is not an employer, i.e., runs
the business alone, the courts have enjoined all picketing on the theory
that the owner of a business may do as he pleases and not be induced
to hire employees. 48  Where a union picketed a closed family cor-
poration, the New York Court of Appeals, refusing to "pierce the
corporate veil" in a four to two decision,49 denied an injunction. The
law is settled, however, that the sole-owner-employee may have all
picketing enjoined. 50 In Wishny v. Jones 51 the employer fired all
42 Id. at 847, N. Y. Supp. at 251.
43 153 Misc. 187, 274 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1934), aff'd w. o., 266 N. Y. 565,
195 N. E. 202 (1935).
4" People v. Ribinovich, 171 Misc. 569, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 135 (1939).
45 Rosman v. United Strictly Kosher Butchers, 164 Misc. 378, 298 N. Y.
Supp. 343 (1937); Note, Picketing in. Non-Labor Disputes (1934) 3 I. J.
A. B. No. 3, p. 1.
46 135 Misc. 363, 274 N. Y. Supp. 946 (1934).
47 The United States Supreme Court, in a similar case, sustained the right
to picket but on the theory that the controversy was a labor dispute. New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703 (1938);(1938) 13 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 171.
48 Luft v. Flove, 246 App. Div. 523, 283 N. Y. Supp. 441 (1st Dept. 1935),
aff'd, 270 N. Y. 640, 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936); Thompson v. Boekout, 273
N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937). These cases were followed in innumer-
able others, one of the latest being Gips v. Osman, 170 Misc. 53, 9 N. Y. S. (2d)
828 (1939). See the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Hubbs in Boro Park
Sanitary Live Poultry v. Heller, 280 N. Y. 481, 487, 21 N. E. (2d) 687, 689
(1939).
49 Boro Park Sanitary Live Poultry v. Heller, 280 N. Y. 481, 21 N. E.
(2d) 687 (1939). Compare Miller v. Fish Workers' Union, 170 Misc. 713,
11 N. Y. S. (2d) 278 (1939), with Schwartz v. Fish Workers' Union, 170
Misc. 566, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 283 (1939).
50 See note 42, supra. Cf. Wishny v. Jones, 169 Misc. 459, 8 N. Y. S. (2d)
2 (1938) ; see Bieber v. Bininbaum, 168 Misc. 943, 6 N . Y. S. (2d) 63 (1938).
51 169 Misc. 459, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 2 (1938).
[ VOL. 14
CURRENT LEGISLATION
his employees and intended to liquidate his business. The court
granted an injunction against all picketing with leave to the defen-
dants to move to set aside the injunction if plaintiff re-engaged in his
business. To the same effect, picketing was enjoined where an em-
ployer rehired only part of his staff because business did not war-
rant the rehiring of all his ex-employees 2  In the preceding cases,
the courts have proceeded on the theory that since the facts do not
constitute a labor dispute and are therefore not within the protection
of 876a, all picketing should be enjoined.
Secondary picketing, even if peaceful, is illegal and therefore
enjoinable. 53 " * * * where there is the attempt to interfere or ruin
the business of one who is not concerned in the dispute between labor
and its employer the boundary of lawful conduct is transgressed and
the secondary boycott is called into being." 54 Thus attempts to
picket the employer's customers, 55 and advertisers in employer's news-
paper, 56 were enjoined as illegal. If the alleged secondary boycott
fits within the scope of the statutory definition of a labor dispute,
peaceful picketing is permissible, even though the facts may resemble
a secondary boycott. Instances of this are where the picketing is
directed against the presence of a non-union contractor,57 or non-
union materials in the same or related crafts 58 especially on con-
struction jobs. Another exception occurs where the picketing is di-
rected against a product at the place of sale.59 The New York Court
of Appeals 60 has created the "unity of interest" rule. Thus where
the claimant handles exclusively, or almost exclusively, the product
of the manufacturer against whom the laborer has the grievance,
picketing of the third party claimant is sustained on the theory of
unity of interest. 6' This is not really a secondary boycott. It is
submitted that the court, in its liberality towards labor, 62 has re-
52 Benito Rovira Co. v. Yampolsky, 187 N. Y. Supp. 894 (1921).
5 B. Gertz, Inc. v. Randau, 162 Misc. 786, 295 N. Y. Supp. 871 (1937).
54Mlle. Reif v. Randau, 166 Misc. 247, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 515 (1937).
55 Canepa v. Doe, 277 N. Y. 52, 12 N. E. (2d) 790 (1938) ; American Gas
Stations v. Doe, 250 App. Div. 227, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (2d Dept. 1937);
Weil & Co. v. Doe, 168 Misc. 211, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 559 (1938); cf. Rand Tea
& Coffee Stores v. Manganero, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 5, 1938, p. 53, col. 3.
56 Mlle. Reif v. Randau, 166 Misc. 247, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 515 (1937).
5 7 New York Lumber Trade Ass'n v. Lacey, 269 N. Y. 595, 199 N. E. 688
(1935), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 684, 56 Sup. Ct. 955 (1936).
58 Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917); Willson &
Adams Co. v. Pearce, 264 N. Y. 521, 191 N. E. 545 (1934).
59 Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937) ; (1938)
12 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 358. See Weil & Co. v. Doe, 168 Misc. 211, 5 N. Y. S.
(2d) 559 (1938).
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Weil & Co. v. Doe, 168 Misc. 211, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 559 (1938) ("The
tendency has been to enlarge rather than to abridge the right to picket"). See
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Lehman in Busch Jewelry Co. V. United
Retail Employees' Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 157, 22 N. E. (2d) 320, 322 (1939);
Trommers v. Brewery Workers, 167 Misc. 197, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 782 (1938).
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garded the claimant as the agent of the manufacturer.6 The gen-
eral rule still is that secondary boycotts are illegal and all such picket-
ing will be enjoined.
IlL
Section 876a of the Civil Practice Act has, however, been re-
sponsible for an abuse. This is illustrated by situations wherein one
union has a closed shop agreement with the employer and another
union pickets to obtain similar benefits for itself. The employer can
not breach his contract with the first union nor can he accede to the
demands of the second union. Injunctive relief is denied because of
the statute holding such a situation to be a labor dispute. Mean-
while the employer's business diminishes because prospective cus-
tomers may be deterred from passing the picket line, either by sym-
pathy for labor in general, or by embarrassment or fear. The em-
ployer in such a case can do nothing but wait for the legislature
to remedy the situation. Of course he can retire, as is usually the
case, for legislators solicit the support of unions at campaign time.
In summation it may be generally said that
(1) In all cases: Picketing accompanied by fraud, violence,
or other illegality is not permissible;
(2) In labor disputes: Peaceful picketing is permissible un--
less contrary to public policy or unless forfeited by
deliberate excesses;
(3) In "non-labor disputes" where:
(a) Labor is not involved: No settled rule at present
but a tendency to regard peaceful picketing as part
of the freedom of speech.
(b). Labor is involved: Peaceful picketing is not
permissible.
ALFRED M. AsCIONE.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES-STATUTORY CHANGES.-When a liti-
gant has the selection of one of two or more inconsistent remedies,
which are available at the same time, a choice made of one, with full
knowledge of all the facts which would enable him to resort to the
other remedy if he so desired, will preclude him from pursuing the
63 See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Rippey in Goldfinger v. Fein-
tuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 291, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 915 (1937).
[ VOL. 14
